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Discussion of Chinese youth in the popular media is often obscuredby such unhelpful labels as “post-1980” (balinghou 八零后) and“post-1990” (jiulinghou 九零后) that tend to focus on collective,
generational characteristics. As the first generation of single children, they
are seen as self-centred “little emperors” lacking the talent for communi-
cation and horizontal interaction. Growing up in the reform era of economic
prosperity and material abundance, they are portrayed as obsessed with ap-
pearance and consumption. Their fixation with high-technology products
in particular have won them names such as “Apple fans” (guofen 果粉) and
the “thumb tribe” (muzhi zu 拇 指 族 ). With little memory of the 1989
Tiananmen demonstrations, they are seen as being less concerned about
politics and more carefree. Unused to hardship, they are characterised as
having the unique inability to “eat bitterness” (chiku 吃苦), succumbing eas-
ily to criticism and pressure. They are called “strawberries” (caomei 草莓) –
polished and attractive in outward appearance but highly vulnerable and
easily wounded. Boys, in particular, are criticised for becoming increasingly
effeminate (nanxing de nüxinghua 男性的女性化). (1)
Several recent reports in the Chinese press have focused on the current
situation of young people, revealing a much more complex reality. Four
years after Lian Si forged the term “ant tribe,” the new catchword today is
diaosi, which refers to a new class of “losers,” analysed at length by New
Weekly in 2012. The discontent experienced by the young people self-iden-
tifying as diaosi, who feel excluded from the benefits of China’s growth, can
be linked to several recent incidents related to the phenomenon of “sec-
ond-generation rich” placing themselves above the law. The first April 2013
issue of South Review similarly ran a cover story on the creeping calcifica-
tion of social strata (jieceng jianghua 阶层僵化; jieceng guhua 阶层固化) in
contemporary China. The editors deplore the emergence of a “winner-takes-
all” (yingjia tongchi 赢家通吃) society dominated by special interest con-
glomerates (teshu liyi jituan 特殊利益集团) that operate above the law
according to “privilege-consciousness” (tequan yishi 特权意识), and warn
of the worrying reproduction of social strata (jieceng zaishengchan 阶层再
生产), which deprives young people of the perspective of upward mobility. 
This essay, taking recent reports on the post-80s and post-90s as a starting
point, will attempt to deconstruct these labels in order to shed light on
some of the more poignant social dividers and barriers confronting different
groups within the new generation. It begins with an analysis of the diaosi
phenomenon and underlying social realities. It then examines the root
causes of popular frustration by looking at the unlevel field of Chinese ed-
ucation to reveal a system that almost systematically reproduces disparity
across generations. The next sections focus respectively on university grad-
uates, many of which make up China’s growing “ant tribe,” and new-gener-
ation rural migrant workers, whose labour rights and rights to urban
citizenship remain highly circumscribed. I point to the ways by which Chi-
nese youth, who call themselves the “new lost generation,” seek to redefine
their role as citizens on their own terms. (2)
The new “losers” and a society increasingly
based on status
An increasingly pervasive sense that talent and effort cannot change
one’s fate has produced collective expressions of self-mockery and self-
deprecatory humour (ziwo tiaokan 自我调侃). Diaosi (屌丝), a coarse
word for loser, has become a popular cultural phenomenon and a symbol
of self-identification for many young male Chinese. (3) In 2011 it was
searched for 41 million times on Google and mentioned over 2 million
times on Weibo. (4) Popularised through Internet blogs and chatrooms,
diaosi refers to those who come from humble family background and are
lacking in good looks. According to the ten “requirements” for a diaosi
listed by the Southern Metropolis Weekly, one must, among other criteria,
always have less than 1,000 yuan in one’s pocket, have no connection
to wealth in social circles, go on long-distance vacation only once every
three to five years, and have no more than three girlfriends before mar-
riage in order to qualify as a diaosi. (5) Diaosi stand at the opposite end
of the social spectrum from the “tall, rich, and handsome” (gaofushuai
高富帅) and the “pale, rich, and beautiful” (baifumei 白富美), boys and
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girls born with silver spoons in their mouths to affluent and well-con-
nected families. 
The primary difference between a diaosi and a gaofushuai is not so much
whether one is rich, but rather how one’s wealth is attained. Gaofushuai
and baifumei have acquired pejorative meanings, referring to those whose
personal success rests entirely on powerful family background. These terms
can be connected with the phenomenon of the erdai. Fu’erdai (富二代), sec-
ond-generation rich, refers to those born into wealthy families with powerful
connections in mainland China. These are the privileged sons and daughters
of government officials (guan’erdai 官二代), army officials (jun’erdai 军二
代), Party members with deep ties to the Communist Party (hong’erdai 红
二代), and superstars such as famous singers, actors, and actresses (xing’er-
dai 星二代). Born to join the ranks of the elite and the powerful, they are
brought up in the best schools complemented with a diverse range of extra-
curricular activities. Prosperous careers await them upon college graduation.
Reports have testified to the “unwritten rule” (buchengwen guiding 不成文
规定) that children of high-ranking officials will be given preferential treat-
ment and are often handed jobs in the government. (6) A recent study by Ts-
inghua University researchers finds strong positive influence of parents’
possession of political capital on children’s career prospect, with guan’erdai
graduates on average earning 13% more than non-guan’erdai graduates in
their first job. (7) There are two times more guan’erdai graduates employed
in the finance industry and five times more in Party organisations and gov-
ernment offices. “The father is the entry pass of the son” (die shi er de
tongxingzheng 爹是儿的通行证) has become a popular and validated say-
ing. In the public’s mind, the fu’erdai has become the symbol of glaring so-
cial divides and social stratification in contemporary Chinese society. Their
behaviour and extravagant lifestyles have become the subject of ridicule
and disparagement, as was recently shown in the Li Tianyi case. (8)
From about 2010 onwards, diaosi has become an increasingly popular self-
identity for young men who turn to the Internet to vent their dissatisfaction
with inequality and lack of opportunity. The general frustration is that no
matter how hard they work, their upward mobility is frequently stalled by
those with family connections, and that their social status can never match
those with powerful backgrounds. They desire to compete on effort and
ability (ping nuli ping nengli 拼努力、拼能力), but instead the only “com-
petition” that seems to matter is that between “fathers” (pingdie 拼爹), or
between the strength of one’s family background. Dissatisfied with reality
but unable to change it, diaosi turn to humour and self-mockery, voluntarily
belittling and denigrating themselves (ziwo aihua 自我矮化, ziwo jiangge
自我降格) while rejecting self advancement (jujue shangjin 拒绝上进) and
sought-after models and theories of “success” (chenggongxue 成功学). On
the blogosphere, among themselves diaosi would playfully compare each
other’s unfortunate circumstances (bican 比惨), and in front of those they
see as privileged or self-elevating, they would ridicule them by labelling
them as gaofushuai and make self-effacing comments such as “I kneel be-
fore you” (geini guile 给你跪了).
Diaosi’s self-mockery can be seen as a weapon of the weak in the sense
that it represents a refusal to accept the standards of success imposed upon
youth by society. By jestingly “bowing down” and “kneeling” before those so-
ciety holds up as paragons of success, it displays a playful irreverence for au-
thority and established institutions through a non-violent but uncooperative
discourse. It can be argued that diaosi serves as a powerful group identification
uniting those who have won their success through self-effort alone. (9) Being
able to say that one is a diaosi is a declaration that one’s achievements do
not depend on family resources. Self-mockery is perhaps also a defensive tac-
tic adopted collectively by the diaosi – to laugh at your own “failure” before
others laugh at you, to joke about yourself before others turn you into a joke.
The cultural phenomenon of diaosi thus reflects a complex reaction to social
reality: anger at inequality combined with cynicism, disillusionment, and an
acute sense of powerlessness; desire for greater material comforts combined
with disdain for secular standards of success; lack of self-confidence combined
with pride in one’s self-effort and marked contempt for the privileged. 
While some are strongly critical of the diaosi culture, criticising it as a
lowbrow version of “the Ah Q spirit of the new generation” (新时期的阿Q
精神), reports such as the 2012 New Weekly cover story are able to put the
finger on the inequality of opportunity and resources. (10) Even the official
press, such as People’s Daily, recognises that diaosi culture “originates ex-
actly from the social reality of wealth polarization”: “Many young people
are faced with the reality that even if they make every effort to struggle,
their wealth is still far behind” the gaofushuai and baifumei. “Therefore it is
easy to understand their complex feeling of ‘diaosi,’ which contains their
dissatisfaction about the reality and powerlessness and helplessness to
change the situation.” (11) However, the author ends by calling on diaosi to
“face up to reality and rely on their independent struggles,” pathetically re-
iterating the narrative of changing one’s fate through individual effort. The
People’s Daily commentary represents the commonplace view that focuses
on individual success and failure rather than systemic inequalities.
The new “lost generation”
To understand the frustration widely shared by those who call themselves
diaosi, it is necessary to examine the system that Chinese youth encounter
and the realities they confront as they move from school to the job market.
Their shared perception that family background matters much more than
either talent or effort stems from their experience of an education system
that not only fails to equalise socio-economic differences but actually ag-
gravates them by reinforcing rural-urban imbalances. Entering working life,
their sense of disillusionment is deepened by the lack of upwardly mobile
opportunities in an overcrowded job market. The monopolisation of oppor-
tunities by youth from the upper strata of society means that those from
the lower strata have basically “lost out at the starting line” (cong qipaoxian
shang jiu yijing shule 从起跑线上就已经输了).
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Current affairs
The unlevel field of education
In contemporary China, the socio-economic status and household regis-
tration (hukou 户口) of the family into which a young person is born have
a singularly decisive effect on his or her access to better education. Although
the central government has invested some 7.79 trillion yuan in education
over the past five years, schools in less developed provinces and rural areas
remain palpably underfunded. (12) According to figures provided by the Min-
istry of Education, while Beijing managed an annual education expenditure
of 20,023 yuan per middle school student in 2010, the backward province
of Guizhou could only afford a meagre 3,204 yuan per student per year. (13)
In rural areas, the lack of access to quality education places rural youth
many steps behind urban students at the starting line, yet few mechanisms
are in place to correct such disadvantages at the tertiary level. The all-de-
cisive college entrance examination commonly known as gaokao (高考) has
for years been criticised for its bias towards urban students (chengshi qing-
xiangxing 城市倾向性). Top universities are noted for demonstrating prefer-
ence for local students (bendi youxianxing 本地优先性), enrolling local
urban students with lower exam scores at the expense of higher-scoring
students from the countryside. As shown in a conference paper, this imbal-
ance is clearly reflected in the rural-to-urban student ratio in China’s top
colleges: in 2010, rural students made up only 17% of Tsinghua’s student
population, despite the fact that over 60% of the 9.57 million students tak-
ing the gaokao that year had rural household registration. (14) Throughout
the 1990s, the respective proportion of rural students enrolled in Tsinghua
and Peking University has wavered between 15% and 22%. Students from
rural areas are also less likely to be enrolled in popular subjects, which fur-
ther impinges on their future career prospect. (15)
In urban areas, gaining equal access to quality education is a struggle for
the children of rural migrant workers (liudong ertong 流动儿童, or nong-
mingong zinü 农民工子女). Because migrant children lack local hukou and
are not included in the budgetary educational expenditure of local govern-
ments, urban schools continue to impose hefty surcharges on migrant par-
ents, including the notoriously expensive temporary student fees (jiedu fei
借读费), education compensation payment (jiaoyu buchang fei 教育补偿
费), and school selection fees (zexiao fei 择校费), the last of which can reach
a prohibitive 230,000 yuan for sought-after schools, as shown in a China
Labour Bulletin report in 2009. (16) Despite recent attempts to abolish some
of these and to provide fee waivers, low-income migrant families continue
to shoulder exorbitant costs in comparison to families with local hukou. 
Access to education is also partially denied to children of middle-class
inter-city migrants (chengji yimin 城际移民), the “green card tribe” (lüka zu
绿卡族). Unlike rural migrant workers, they hold “green cards” – employment
and residential permits (gongzuo juzhu zheng 工作居住证) – which allow
them to enjoy much better benefits such as exemption from the temporary
student fee. (17) However, like rural migrant workers, their non-local children
face the barrier of hukou restrictions in applying for the college entrance
examination. According to existing stipulations, and until the very recent
introduction of policy changes, mainland students have been required to
return to their place of household registration to take the gaokao. 
In Beijing, parents of migrant children denied equal access to education
have organised themselves into the United Citizen Action for Education
Equality (jiaoyu pingdeng gongmin lianhe xingdong 教育平等公民联合行动)
with the support of prominent lawyers and public intellectuals including
Zhang Qianfan and Yu Jianrong. (18) In recent years, the group has staged mul-
tiple events such as the collection of signatures for petitions and fund-raising
activities to fight for the abolition of hukou restrictions in higher education
for non-local youth (yidi gaokao 异地高考). Responding to growing resent-
ment, the announcement was made in December 2012 that Beijing, Shang-
hai, and Guangdong Province will begin phasing in access to the gaokao for
migrant students. In the southern province, migrant students will be able to
take the exam and apply to university on an equal footing with legal resi-
dents from 2016. In Beijing and Shanghai, they can sit the exam, but univer-
sity applications will still be processed in their legal place of residence. (19)
It is only a very limited victory for migrant families, however, as stringent
requirements remain in place for students to qualify for these more relaxed
rules. Many migrant children are thus forced to return to their places of ori-
gin to continue higher education, and for those from less developed inland
cities or the countryside this usually implies not only separating from their
parents and adjusting to a change of environment on their own but also
settling for vastly inferior schools. (20) Some drop out of school while others
end up in polytechnics and vocational schools operated by local govern-
ments and private businesses, while their peers with local urban hukou enter
prestigious, heavily subsidised universities with much greater ease. (21)
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Emerging from three years of polytechnic training, few have well-paying
careers awaiting them upon graduation.
China’s army of unemployed graduates
High rates of joblessness among graduates have become a noted phe-
nomenon as college enrolment reached 60% nationwide. According to the
Chinese College Graduates’ Employment Annual Report published in June
2012, among 6 million 2011 university graduates, some 570,000 remained
unemployed one year later, with at least 100,000 being financially depend-
ent on their parents, a status colloquially referred to as “biting the old” (ken-
lao 啃老). (22) The addition of 6.8 million fresh graduates in 2012 further
aggravated the strain of finding employment, as the report found recruit-
ment rates for the new batch to be as low as 42%. (23) Many fall into the
unemployed category as soon as they graduate (biye ji shiye 毕业即失业).
It is estimated that at least 13 million new jobs are needed to satisfy the
basic demand arising from the fast-growing “army of unemployed gradu-
ates” (daxuesheng shiye juntuan 大学生失业军团). 
The possession of a university degree does not guarantee better pay, ei-
ther. Although the highest starting salary for 2011 graduates stood at an
impressive 100,000 yuan per month, only 3% of graduates were able to
fetch monthly salaries higher than 5,000 yuan. For 70% of those lucky
enough to find jobs at all, the starting salary was below 2,000 yuan per
month, about the same as the average monthly wage of migrant workers,
which reached 2,049 yuan in 2011. (24) It is estimated that, due to labour
shortages in factories and construction sites, the average starting salary
for migrant workers grew nearly 80% between 2003 and 2009. During the
same period, the starting wage for college graduates remained stagnant. (25)
Some critics contend that because parents struggle so much to send
their children to universities and polytechnics, these tertiary institutions
are almost “held accountable” for making sure students graduate. Dropout
rates in China’s universities are uncommonly low, resulting in large pools
of unqualified degree-holders competing for jobs. (26) The change came
after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, when, faced with the need to stimu-
late a faltering economy by boosting domestic consumption, the Zhu
Rongji cabinet undertook the commercialisation and industrialisation of
tertiary education. As a result of increased admissions, the number of uni-
versity students grew fivefold in a decade, rising from just over 1 million
in 1998 to 5.68 million in 2008. (27) Despite impressive growth in the re-
cent decade, the Chinese economy simply has not generated enough pro-
fessional, white-collar jobs to absorb the masses of graduates. The surge
of supply in foreign language-speaking graduates well trained in account-
ing, finance, and computer programming has led to an overall decrease in
the value of college degrees. Weak economies abroad in recent years have
further increased the number of students returning to mainland China to
seek employment after completing their education overseas, further in-
tensifying competition in the job market. (28) Returnees, colloquially called
the “sea turtles” due to identical pronunciation in the Chinese (haigui 海
龟、海归), enjoy special privileges such as residency permits and prefer-
ential employment access that are not extended to local graduates. The
latest figures released by the government show that this year a staggering
1.5 million people registered for the civil service entrance examinations,
a 15% increase from 2012. It was reported in October last year that more
than 9,000 people competed for a single job in the Chongqing municipal
statistics bureau. (29)
Highly-educated graduates of local universities who are unemployed or
stuck at temporary, low-paying jobs have come to be known as the “ant
tribe” (yi zu 蚁族) following the publication of an enormously popular
eponymous book by Lian Si, a post-80s researcher, in 2009. They are so
called due to their similarity to ants – they have high levels of intelligence
but are vulnerable in socio-economic terms, and they live together in
colonies (gaozhi ruoxiao qunju 高智、弱小、群居). According to Lian Si,
as of 2010 there were an estimated 150,000 “ants” each in Beijing and
Shanghai, in addition to 100,000 each in five other major cities including
Guangzhou, Chongqing, and Nanjing. (30) Most of them come from poor
families with annual incomes of less than 50,000 yuan, and lack the
money and social connections enjoyed by students from big cities. The
rural-urban divide within the “ant” population is obvious – about 54.7%
come from the countryside, while another 38.3% come from less eco-
nomically advanced counties or prefecture-level cities. (31)
Although the option of returning home is available, the shame of going
back without a promising career after their parents have spent almost all
family savings on their education keeps them from doing so. They choose
instead to stay behind in big cities, which continue to be perceived as places
of opportunity, and endure the hardship of living on meagre incomes and
in sub-standard housing. Unable to afford the cost of renting private flats
in inner city districts, they turn to the suburbs, where bunk beds in sub-di-
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Eastern region 31.40% 72.30%
Central region 38.20% 12.90%
Western region 30.40% 14.40%
Table 1 – Geographical distribution of 
new-generation migrant workers in China
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, March 2011.
vided rooms stuck away in cramped alleys are available for rent at about
300-600 yuan per month. (32) Before its demolition in 2010, one such “ant
colony” or “intellectual slum” was Tangjialing, a village in north-western Bei-
jing housing more than 50,000 non-local residents, a significant proportion
of which were unemployed or low-income recent graduates. Located close
to Zhongguancun, China’s “Silicon Valley,” Tangjialing provided cheap ac-
commodation for many who commuted to the city centre or worked in the
neighbourhood as “sales in private business,” which for technical engineers
means “peddling low-end electronic gear for the city’s computer whole-
salers.” (33) Deemed an offense to the city image and a hotbed of unautho-
rised construction, Tangjialing with its prime location was redeveloped in
2010. (34) Nonetheless, the issue of “ants” was left unresolved – they simply
swarmed to villages further out in the suburbs. (35)
To tackle the issue of youth unemployment, the government has recently
encouraged the growth of small- and medium-sized cities to help ease pres-
sure on over-expanded coastal metropolises. Steady economic growth re-
sulting in rising salaries has vastly increased the attraction of working in
second- and third-tier cities. Local governments have been eager to lure mi-
grants back by organising large job fairs, even offering guaranteed job place-
ment and monetary incentives to young graduates. (36) For the young
graduates, the comparatively lower cost of living in inland cities means that
buying property is an achievable task. The “tide of return” (huixiangchao 回
乡潮) is becoming more observable in coastal cities such as Xiamen, which
has seen the departure of more than 36,000 registered migrant workers in
the first two months of 2013 alone. (37) It remains doubtful, however,
whether this tendency can contribute to solving the problem of “ant tribe”
graduates.
“New-generation” migrant workers
While young urbanites are voicing their discontent, it seems that young
people from rural areas are also increasingly well informed of their rights
and hence prone to questioning their current status. Rural youths are mov-
ing en masse into cities at ever earlier ages in search of employment. While
rural-to-urban migrants of the older generations left for the city at an av-
erage age of 33.7, rural youths born in the 1980s moved from the country-
side at the average age of 21.1, and those born in the 1990s at 17.2. (38)
Some join their parents, while others have friends or relatives who are able
to arrange low-skilled jobs for them.
The mass exodus of young people from the countryside has over the years
resulted in important generational variations within the rural-to-urban mi-
grant workforce. According to figures released by the National Bureau of
Statistics in 2011, as of 2010 there were about 84.87 million migrant work-
ers born after the year 1980, making up 58.4% of the total migrant work-
force. (39) Often called “second-generation” or “new-generation” migrant
workers (erdai nongmingong 二代农民工; xinshengdai nongmingong 新生
代农民工), they are more educated, more urbanised in their lifestyle, more
rights-conscious, and altogether much less attached to the countryside than
their predecessors. In terms of education, 28.9% of new-generation migrants
have received high school education or above, compared with just 15.9%
for first-generation migrants (Table 2). In terms of employment, while man-
ufacturing is the largest employer of migrant labour across generational di-
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Characteristics of human capital
Previous generation New generation
Average years of education 8.8 9.8
Level of education (%)
Illiterate and semi-literate 2.2 0.4
Primary school 16.7 6.3
Middle school 65.2 64.4
High school 12.4 13.5
Vocational school 2.1 9
Tertiary and above 1.4 6.4
Participation in vocational training (%) 26.5 30.4
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, March 2011.
Table 2 – Level of education of migrant workers in China
Migrant workers
vides, young migrants are much less inclined to take up jobs in the con-
struction sector, and a larger proportion of them work in the service indus-
tries (Table 3). 
One of the most distinctive features of new-generation migrants is their
degree of integration into urban life. For first-generation migrants, working
in the city is seen as a temporary measure for earning extra cash. Many
continue to farm land in the countryside (yigong yinong 亦工亦农), shuttling
flexibly between urban and rural areas as a quintessential “floating” popu-
lation, with the goal of making enough to ultimately settle back in the coun-
tryside. The benefits of urban residency such as welfare and social security
were simply not made available to them. For the post-1980 migrants, how-
ever, many flock to cities with the desire to stay in the long run and become
full urban residents. Unlike earlier migrants, who might have been compelled
to leave the countryside for purely economic reasons, the young migrants
are primarily pulled by the attraction of city life and multitudinous non-
economic factors, such as boredom with village life and the desire to pursue
freedom from parents. (40)
As the majority of them lack basic farming skills but are highly attuned
to urban culture, many feel more at home in cities than in rural areas. (41)
Intending to settle for the long term, their goal is not only to make money
but also to gain experience and find better opportunities for development.
In many ways they behave no differently from urban youth, sharing not
only similar ways of thinking in terms of career pursuit but also a similar
sense of fashion, manners, living, and consumption habits. A report by the
former National Population and Family Planning Commission found that
while first-generation migrant workers “practiced thrift as much as they
could for their children,” the new generation “actively pursue leisure and
comfort,” spending “most of their income on their own food, clothing,
housing, and transportation but seldom remit money they earn to their
families in the countryside.” (42) Relieved of the burden previously borne by
first-generation migrants to send money home, many spend it on favourite
pastimes such as karaoke and disco dancing as well as consumer products
such as electronics. Yueguangzu (月光族), often inadequately translated as
“moonlight tribe,” became a popular term describing those who spend all
they earn so that their pockets are empty by the end of the month. (43)
Concerned about the influence of such “unhealthy and inherent bad
habits,” the state has stepped up its efforts to manage young migrants by
providing clean entertainment and educational alternatives for leisure
time. (44) In Dongguan City, the largest magnet for migrant workers in South
China, town libraries are opened to migrant workers, and training classes
in languages and accounting skills are offered all year round. However, de-
spite their degree of integration into urban life, many entitlements and
even basic social services are not available to the young migrants, as they
are not registered as local residents. Only 34.8% of migrant workers are
provided with basic medical care and 21.3% with pension insurance; a mere
8.5% are eligible for unemployment benefits. (45) Among new-generation
migrant workers, 54.4% do not have formal labour contracts signed with
employers. (46) Many companies simply evade their legal responsibility to
provide social insurance for their employees. The lack of protection is par-
ticularly worrying given the poor working conditions many migrants en-
counter at the workplace. 
Fighting for rights
Increasingly, new-generation migrant workers are taking a more active
role in mobilising collective action in defence of their own rights. The pas-
sage of the Labour Contract Law and the Labour Dispute Mediation and Ar-
bitration Law in 2008 drastically increased the number of labour dispute
cases, particularly in the aftermath of the 2008-9 global financial crisis that
left tens of millions unemployed. (47) According to the Shenzhen-based In-
stitute of Contemporary Observation, there were 1.27 million cases of
labour disputes and collective action in 2011, including more than 1,000
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Current affairs
Distribution of employment (%)
Average Previous generation New generation
Manufacturing 39.1 31.5 44.4
Construction 17.3 27.8 9.8
Transportation, storage, postal services 5.9 7.1 5
Wholesale and retail 7.8 6.9 8.4
Accommodation and catering 7.8 5.9 9.2
Services 11.8 11 12.4
Others 10.3 9.8 10.8
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, March 2011.
Table 3 – Employment structure of migrant workers in China
Migrant workers
large-scale strikes. (48) New-generation migrant workers have played an im-
portant role in many of these. Compared with first-generation migrant
workers, they demonstrate better knowledge of relevant labour laws and a
stronger sense of protection of their own legal rights. Their adeptness in
new media technologies and social networking tools also enables them to
organise efficiently and to publicise their struggles effectively to a wider
audience.
A well-known example of the growing rights-awareness of the new gen-
eration of migrant workers is the 2010 strikes at Honda’s assembly plants
in Guangdong Province, which were lauded by China Newsweek as a prime
demonstration of the leadership and ingenuity of these young workers. The
19-day strike at Honda Nanhai, which successfully forced management to
the negotiating table, secured a pay rise, and inspired similar protests at
other Honda plants, was initiated and organised by two post-1980 work-
ers. (49) Utilising the QQ instant messaging service, the young workers were
able not only to keep each other updated on the progress of the strike, but
also to inform reporters, lawyers, and labour rights activists of latest devel-
opments. During the strike at Honda’s Zhongshan plant, the new-generation
workers publicised their cause by videotaping the strike and posting it online
so as to “keep everybody informed of the injustices” they were suffering. (50)
Some of these actions have resulted in more substantive victories than pay
rises. In 2012, when more than 700 employees – mostly young migrant
workers – at the Ohms Electronics factory in Shenzhen staged a collective
walk-off, they won the right to elect a representative for the factory’s branch
of the labour union from the bottom up. (51) As new-generation workers be-
come increasingly active in defending their rights, the call for democratic
elections of union representatives may become louder yet.
Conclusion: Towards greater equality?
This paper has focused on the systemic inequalities affecting Chinese
youth today and the struggles many must go through to attain their “Chi-
nese dream.” While the lavish lifestyle of the rich second generation has at-
tracted much attention and online gazing (wangluo weiguan 网络围观), for
the vast majority of Chinese youth the rat race begins as soon as they are
placed without choice in an unequal education system that privileges the
urban and the rich. On entering the job market, those with less education
find themselves defending against an exploitative labour regime, while those
with more education find themselves unemployed or stuck at low-paying
jobs as their better-connected, overseas-returning peers snatch up enviable
positions in the government and multi-national corporations. Therefore,
while catchwords such as diaosi may seem anecdotal, they in fact point to
deep-rooted problems within Chinese society.
While careful analytical studies such as Martin King Whyte’s Myth of the
Social Volcano (2010) temper more sensational accounts of the volatility
of brewing discontent, it is undeniable that frustration with the rigidity of
social structure and the distinct lack of upward mobility (jieceng liudongxing
阶层流动性) has increased. The more critical mainland press is becoming
more vocal in censuring the inter-generational inheritance of advantage and
disadvantage, and even the official press sometimes speaks out. For exam-
ple, after the Li Tianyi case, People’s Daily took the lead in lashing out against
the spoiled children of privileged families: “Used to getting everything they
want and having all their problems handled, they will use their father’s name
as an excuse, take flaunting wealth for granted, and regard defying the law
as brave behaviour.” (52) It remains to be seen, however, whether such
episodic outpouring of indignation surrounding sensational fu’erdai cases
can develop into deeper and more systematic analysis of the issue of po-
larisation and social stratification in contemporary China.
Within the new generation, young people are increasingly willing to seize
opportunities for collective action, from anti-Japanese protests to environ-
mental activism, to vent their frustration with issues such as unemployment
and income inequality. From the active defence of labour rights to the ir-
reverent deconstruction of privilege and authority through diaosi humour,
young people are critically and creatively engaging with the issues of in-
equality and immobility in their own terms. These may not present a united
front challenging the beneficiaries of the current unequal order, but they
certainly point to new ways of negotiating identities for China’s young gen-
eration.
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